

Using Cryptographic Hardware to Secure Applications

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This presentation explains how to use cryptographic hardware in client applications.

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<http://momjian.us/presentations>

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Outline

1. *Openssh* configuration
2. OpenPGP configuration
3. OpenPGP usage
4. PIV vs OpenPGP
5. Postgres usage
6. Database encryption scope
7. Private key storage options
8. Conclusion

1. Openssh Configuration

```
# host does not allow password authentication
```

```
$ ssh postgres@momjian.us
```

```
Permission denied (publickey).
```

```
# can also use ssh-keygen -D openssl-pkcs11.so -e
```

```
# use the PIV AUTH key'' (1)
```

```
$ pkcs15-tool --read-ssh-key 1 --output ssh.pub
```

```
Using reader with a card: Yubico Yubikey 4 OTP+U2F+CCID 00 00
```

```
Please enter PIN [PIV Card Holder pin]:
```

```
$ cat ssh.pub
```

```
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQDBrGGJqMxb...
```

```
$ sudo sh -c 'cat ssh.pub >> ~postgres/.ssh/authorized_keys'
```

```
$ rm ssh.pub
```

```
$ ssh -I '$OPENSCH' postgres@momjian.us
```

```
Enter PIN for 'PIV_II (PIV Card Holder pin)':
```

```
Last login: Wed Aug 16 22:52:21 2017 from momjian.us
```

```
$ id
```

```
uid=109(postgres) gid=117(postgres) groups=117(postgres),111(ssl-cert)
```

Add PKCS#11 Provider for a Host

```
$ cp ~/.ssh/config ~/.ssh/config.orig

# OPENC set previously
$ echo "
> Host momjian.us
> PKCS11Provider $OPENC" >> ~/.ssh/config

# -I not needed
$ ssh postgres@momjian.us
Enter PIN for 'PIV_II (PIV Card Holder pin)':
Last login: Fri Aug 18 15:23:09 2017 from momjian.us
$
```

<https://ef.gy/hardening-ssh>

Use *ssh-agent* To Avoid Repeated PIN Entry

```
# restore config file since we are going to use ssh-agent, not the library directly
$ mv ~/.ssh/config.orig ~/.ssh/config
```

```
$ eval $(ssh-agent -s)
Agent pid 9103
$ ssh-add -s "$OPENSC"
Enter passphrase for PKCS#11:
Card added: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/opensc-pkcs11.so
```

```
$ ssh postgres@momjian.us
Last login: Sat Aug 19 10:05:01 2017 from momjian.us
$
```

```
$ ssh -I $OPENSC postgres@momjian.us
Enter PIN for 'PIV_II (PIV Card Holder pin)':
```

<https://wikitech.wikimedia.org/wiki/Yubikey-SSH>
<https://utcc.utoronto.ca/~cks/space/blog/sysadmin/Yubikey4ForSSHKeys>

ssh-agentd: Script for controlling *ssh-agent*, Part 1

```
$ cat > ssh-agentd <END
[ "$#" -gt 1 -o \( "$#" -eq 1 -a "$1" != "-k" -a "$1" != "-r" -a "$1" != "-s" \) ]
    echo "Usage: $(basename $0) -[krs]" 1>&2
# can't 'exit' since we are being sourced into the shell, we assume no args

# -k stop the running daemon
# -r reload the keys (non-SSH access to the device disconnects ssh-agent)
# -s status
# We don't restart for -r because it would change the required environment
# settings for other sessions.

# Export environment variables for connecting to ssh-agent,
# and optionally start it.
# Should be dot-sourced to set env variables, e.g., ". ssh-agentd",
# -k only stops the running daemon.

# The ssh-agent daemon launched by sshd and gnome-session doesn't
# understand PKCS11 so we have to launch our own and set environment
# variables to point to our own. This is why we can't use SSH_AUTH_SOCKET
# to determine if we have a valid ssh-agent.
```

ssh-agentd: Part 2

```
# Only stop daemon?
if [ "$1" = "-k" ]
then    if [ -s ~/.ssh-agent.pid ]
        then    SSH_AGENT_PID="$(cat ~/.ssh-agent.pid)" \
                ssh-agent -k > ~/.ssh-agent.env
                . ~/.ssh-agent.env
                rm ~/.ssh-agent.pid ~/.ssh-agent.env
        fi
else    if [ -s ~/.ssh-agent.pid ] &&
        kill -0 "$(cat ~/.ssh-agent.pid)" >/dev/null 2>&1
        then    # load environment
                if [ "$1" = "-s" ]
                then    echo "Agent pid $(cat ~/.ssh-agent.pid)"
                else    . ~/.ssh-agent.env > /dev/null
                        if [ "$1" = "-r" ]
                        then    ssh-add -e "$OPENSC"
                                ssh-add -s "$OPENSC"
                        fi
                fi
        fi
```

ssh-agentd: Part 3

```
elif [ "$1" != "-s" ]
then    # execute this if no daemon is running, even with -r
        # start ssh-agent; save and set environment
        ssh-agent -s > ~/.ssh-agent.env
        . "$HOME"/.ssh-agent.env > /dev/null
        echo "$SSH_AGENT_PID" > ~/.ssh-agent.pid

        # Add PKCS#11 keys
        . /etc/opensc.env
        ssh-add -s "$OPENSC"
fi
fi
END
```

Consider keychain instead: <http://nullprogram.com/blog/2012/06/08/>

ssh-agentd: Installation

```
$ chmod +x ssh-agentd  
$ chown root:root ssh-agentd  
$ sudo cp ssh-agentd /usr/local/bin
```

Various *ssh-agent* scripts: <https://stackoverflow.com/questions/18880024/start-ssh-agent-on-login>

ssh-agentd: Usage

```
$ . ssh-agentd
$ ssh postgres@momjian.us
Last login: Sat Aug 19 12:32:18 2017 from momjian.us
$
```

```
$ pkcs11-tool --module "$OPENSC" --show-info
Cryptoki version 2.20
Manufacturer      OpenSC (www.opensc-project.org)
Library           Smart card PKCS#11 API (ver 0.0)
Using slot 1 with a present token (0x1)
$ ssh postgres@momjian.us
Connection closed by 127.0.0.1
```

ssh-agentd: Usage

```
$ . ssh-agentd -r
Card removed: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/opensc-pkcs11.so
Enter passphrase for PKCS#11:
Card added: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/opensc-pkcs11.so
$ ssh postgres@momjian.us
Last login: Sat Aug 19 12:33:11 2017 from momjian.us
$
```

```
$ . ssh-agentd -s
Agent pid 27825
```

must be stopped or it will interfere with gpg's sddaemon

```
$. ssh-agentd -k
Agent pid 27825 killed
```

2. OpenPGP Configuration

Originally designed for email encryption and signing, OpenPGP supports other applications:

- ▶ file encryption
- ▶ file signing (e.g., documents, binaries)
- ▶ *openssh* and PAM authentication
- ▶ *git* commit signing
- ▶ Postgres encryption and signing

OpenPGP standard: <https://gnupg.org/ftp/specs/OpenPGP-smart-card-application-3.3.1.pdf>

OpenPGP Configuration

- ▶ Historically, OpenPGP (*pgp* and *gpg*) contained a single active subkey used for signing, encryption, and authentication
 - ▶ It can also contain historical keys and the keys of trusted individuals
- ▶ Modern OpenPGP uses subkeys with dedicated roles, e.g., signing, encryption, authentication, like PIV
- ▶ Expiration and revocation are also supported
- ▶ A primary/master key signs the subkeys and is optionally kept off line
- ▶ This more closely matches TLS/SSL certificate authority usage

<https://wiki.debian.org/Subkeys>

Operating System Software

```
$ sudo apt-get install gnupg2 sddaemon
```

Check the Card's Status

```
$ gpg2 --card-status
Application ID ...: D2760001240102010006062515440000
Version .....: 2.1
Manufacturer ..: Yubico
Serial number ..: 06251544
Name of cardholder: [not set]
Language prefs ...: [not set]
Sex .....: unspecified
URL of public key : [not set]
Login data .....: [not set]
Signature PIN ....: not forced
Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
Max. PIN lengths .: 127 127 127
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
Signature counter : 0
Signature key ....: [none]
Encryption key....: [none]
Authentication key: [none]
General key info..: [none]
```

Blue fields can be populated manually using `gpg2 --card-edit`.

https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/Card_edit.html

gpg-agentd: Script for controlling *gpg-agent*, Part 1

```
$ cat > gpg-agentd <END
[ "$#" -gt 1 -o \( "$#" -eq 1 -a "$1" != "-k" -a "$1" != "-r" -a "$1" != "-s" \) ]
    echo "Usage: $(basename $0) -[krs]" 1>&2
# can't 'exit' since we are being sourced into the shell, we assume no args

# -k stop the running daemon
# -r reload the connection
# -s status
# We don't restart for -r because it would change the required environment
# settings for other sessions.

# Export environment variables for connecting to gpg-agent,
# and optionally start it.
# Should be dot-sourced to set env variables, e.g., ". gpg-agentd",
# -k only stops the running daemon
```

<http://lorgor.blogspot.com/2017/01/yubikey-gpgssh-great-security-but.html>

gpg-agentd: Part 2

```
# Only stop daemon?
if [ "$1" = "-k" ]
then    if [ -s ~/.gpg-agentd.pid ]
        then    kill "$(cat ~/.gpg-agentd.pid)"
                unset GPG_AGENT_INFO
                rm ~/.gpg-agentd.pid ~/.gpg-agentd.env
                echo 'Agent stopped'
        fi
else    if [ -s ~/.gpg-agentd.pid ] &&
        kill -0 "$(cat ~/.gpg-agentd.pid)" >/dev/null 2>&1
    then    # load environment
            if [ "$1" = "-s" ]
            then    echo "Agent pid $(cat ~/.gpg-agentd.pid)"
            else    . ~/.gpg-agentd.env > /dev/null
                    if [ "$1" = "-r" ]
                    then    gpg-connect-agent reloadagent /bye
                            #gpg-connect-agent "SCD RESET" /bye
                    fi
            fi
    fi
```

gpg-agentd: Part 3

```
elif [ "$1" != "-s" ]
then    # execute this if no daemon is running, even with -r
        # start gpg-agent; save and set environment
        gpg-agent -s --enable-ssh-support --daemon > ~/.gpg-agentd.env
        . "$HOME"/.gpg-agentd.env > /dev/null
        echo "$GPG_AGENT_INFO" | awk -F: '{print $2}' > ~/.gpg-agentd.pid
fi
fi
END
```

gpg-agentd: Installation and Running

```
$ chmod +x gpg-agentd  
$ chown root:root gpg-agentd  
$ sudo cp gpg-agentd /usr/local/bin
```

```
$ . gpg-agentd
```

```
$ gpg-connect-agent <<END
```

```
/echo Resetting GPG card
```

```
/hex
```

```
scd serialno
```

```
scd apdu 00 20 00 81 08 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
```

```
scd apdu 00 20 00 81 08 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
```

```
scd apdu 00 20 00 81 08 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
```

```
scd apdu 00 20 00 81 08 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
```

```
scd apdu 00 20 00 83 08 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
```

```
scd apdu 00 20 00 83 08 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
```

```
scd apdu 00 20 00 83 08 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
```

```
scd apdu 00 20 00 83 08 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
```

```
scd apdu 00 e6 00 00
```

```
scd apdu 00 44 00 00
```

```
END
```

<https://developers.yubico.com/ykneo-openpgp/ResetApplet.html>

Set configuration of PIN, Reset Code, and Admin Code

```
#!/bin/bash
```

```
cd "$HOME" || exit 1  
umask 0077
```

```
mkdir .yubikey 2> /dev/null  
rm -f .yubikey/openpgp.*
```



```
PIN="$(dd if=/dev/random bs=1 count=6 2>/dev/null |  
    hexdump -v -e '/1 "%u"|cut -c1-6)"  
echo -n "Change PIN (old PIN is '123456') to "  
echo "$PIN" | tee .yubikey/openpgp.pin  
echo  
# clear DISPLAY so we can paste in the new value  
DISPLAY="" gpg2 --change-pin
```

Set configuration of PIN, Reset Code, and Admin Code



```
# same as PUK
RESET="$(dd if=/dev/random bs=1 count=8 2>/dev/null |
    hexdump -v -e '/1 "%u"|cut -c1-8)"
echo -n "SET Reset Code (PUK) (Admin PIN is '12345678') "
echo "$RESET" | tee .yubikey/openpgp.reset
echo
DISPLAY="" gpg2 --change-pin

ADMIN="$(dd if=/dev/random bs=1 count=8 2>/dev/null |
    hexdump -v -e '/1 "%u"|cut -c1-8)"
echo -n "Change Admin PIN (old Admin PIN is '12345678') "
echo "$ADMIN" | tee .yubikey/openpgp.admin
echo
DISPLAY="" gpg2 --change-pin
```



The Key Creation Process




The Key Creation Process



The Key Creation Process



The Key Creation Process



Create the Primary/Master Key

```
$ gpg2 --gen-key
gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.26; Copyright (C) 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
Please select what kind of key you want:
  (1) RSA and RSA (default)
  (2) DSA and Elgamal
  (3) DSA (sign only)
  (4) RSA (sign only)
Your selection?
RSA keys may be between 1024 and 4096 bits long.
What keysize do you want? (2048)
Requested keysize is 2048 bits
Please specify how long the key should be valid.
  0 = key does not expire
  <n> = key expires in n days
  <n>w = key expires in n weeks
  <n>m = key expires in n months
  <n>y = key expires in n years
Key is valid for? (0)
Key does not expire at all
Is this correct? (y/N) y
```

https://blog.liw.fi/posts/2017/05/29/using_a_yubikey_4_for_ensafening_one_s_encryption/

Create the Primary/Master Key

GnuPG needs to construct a user ID to identify your key.

Real name: Bruce Momjian

Email address: bruce@momjian.us

Comment:

You selected this USER-ID:

"Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>"

Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? 0

You need a Passphrase to protect your secret key.

Create a Sign Subkey

```
KEYID="$(gpg2 --list-keys | awk -F '[/ ][/ ]*' '$1 == "pub" {print $3; exit}')"
```

```
$ gpg2 --expert --edit-key "$KEYID"
```

```
Secret key is available.
```

```
pub 2048R/E23FAD7B created: 2017-08-24 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: ultimate
sub 2048R/3AF0B4AC created: 2017-08-24 expires: never usage: E
[ultimate] (1). Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

Subkeys: <https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/112059/purpose-of-secret-subkeys>

Create a Sign Subkey

```
gpg> addkey  
Key is protected.
```

```
You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for  
user: "Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>"  
2048-bit RSA key, ID 4098392D, created 2017-08-24
```

```
gpg: can't connect to the agent - trying fall back  
Please select what kind of key you want:
```

- (3) DSA (sign only)
- (4) RSA (sign only)
- (5) Elgamal (encrypt only)
- (6) RSA (encrypt only)
- (7) DSA (set your own capabilities)
- (8) RSA (set your own capabilities)

```
Your selection? 8
```

Create a Sign Subkey

Possible actions for a RSA key: Sign Encrypt Authenticate

Current allowed actions: Sign Encrypt

- (S) Toggle the sign capability
- (E) Toggle the encrypt capability
- (A) Toggle the authenticate capability
- (Q) Finished

Your selection? e

Possible actions for a RSA key: Sign Encrypt Authenticate

Current allowed actions: Sign

- (S) Toggle the sign capability
- (E) Toggle the encrypt capability
- (A) Toggle the authenticate capability
- (Q) Finished

Your selection? q

Create a Sign Subkey

RSA keys may be between 1024 and 4096 bits long.

What keysize do you want? (2048)

Requested keysize is 2048 bits

Please specify how long the key should be valid.

0 = key does not expire

<n> = key expires in n days

<n>w = key expires in n weeks

<n>m = key expires in n months

<n>y = key expires in n years

Key is valid for? (0)

Key does not expire at all

Is this correct? (y/N) **y**

Really create? (y/N) **y**

gpg2 Codes

Usage types:

- A authenticate
- C certificate creation
- E encrypt
- S sign

Key types:

- pub public primary/master key
- ssb secret (private) subkey
- sec secret (private) primary/master key
- sub public subkey

<https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/31996/how-are-the-gpg-usage-flags-defined-in-the-key-details-listing>

Create a Sign Subkey

```
pub 2048R/E23FAD7B  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never      usage: SC
                        trust: ultimate    validity: ultimate
sub 2048R/3AF0B4AC  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never      usage: E
sub
2048R/28B2789A  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never      usage: S
[ultimate] (1). Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

```
gpg> toggle
```

```
sec 2048R/E23FAD7B  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/3AF0B4AC  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/28B2789A  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
(1) Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

```
gpg> save
```

Create an Authenticate Subkey on the Card

```
$ gpg2 --expert --edit-key "$KEYID"
```

```
Secret key is available.
```

```
pub 2048R/E23FAD7B created: 2017-08-24 expires: never      usage: SC
                        trust: ultimate   validity: ultimate
sub 2048R/3AF0B4AC created: 2017-08-24 expires: never      usage: E
sub 2048R/28B2789A created: 2017-08-24 expires: never      usage: S
[ultimate] (1). Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

```
gpg> addcardkey
```

```
Signature key . . . . : [none]
```

```
Encryption key . . . . : [none]
```

```
Authentication key: [none]
```

Authenticate keys are easier to replace than sign or encrypt keys,
so having a backup is not as critical.

Create an Authenticate Subkey on the Card

Please select the type of key to generate:

- (1) Signature key
- (2) Encryption key
- (3) Authentication key

Your selection? 3

Create an Authenticate Subkey on the Card

What keysize do you want for the Authentication key? (2048)

Key is protected.

You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for

user: "Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>"

2048-bit RSA key, ID E23FAD7B, created 2017-08-24

Please specify how long the key should be valid.

0 = key does not expire

<n> = key expires in n days

<n>w = key expires in n weeks

<n>m = key expires in n months

<n>y = key expires in n years

Key is valid for? (0)

Key does not expire at all

Is this correct? (y/N) **y**

Really create? (y/N) **y**

Create an Authenticate Subkey on the Card

```
pub 2048R/E23FAD7B  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never      usage: SC
                        trust: ultimate    validity: ultimate
sub 2048R/3AF0B4AC  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never      usage: E
sub 2048R/28B2789A  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never      usage: S
sub 2048R/21056797  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never      usage: A
[ultimate] (1). Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

gpg> toggle

```
sec 2048R/E23FAD7B  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/3AF0B4AC  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/28B2789A  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/21056797  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 06251544
```

(1) Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>

gpg> save

Check the Card's Status

```
$ gpg2 --card-status
```

```
Application ID ....: D2760001240102010006062515440000
```

```
Version .....: 2.1
```

```
Manufacturer .....: Yubico
```

```
Serial number ....: 06251544
```

```
Name of cardholder: [not set]
```

```
Language prefs ...: [not set]
```

```
Sex .....: unspecified
```

```
URL of public key : [not set]
```

```
Login data .....: [not set]
```

```
Signature PIN ....: not forced
```

```
Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
```

```
Max. PIN lengths .: 127 127 127
```

```
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
```

```
Signature counter : 0
```

```
Signature key .....: [none]
```

```
Encryption key.....: [none]
```

```
Authentication key: 3D2E 34A5 8444 40E4 AA17 1AC5 8238 E67A 2105 6797
```

```
created .....: 2017-08-24 22:47:12
```

```
General key info.: pub 2048R/21056797 2017-08-24 Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

```
sec 2048R/E23FAD7B created: 2017-08-24 expires: never
```

```
ssb 2048R/3AF0B4AC created: 2017-08-24 expires: never
```

```
ssb 2048R/28B2789A created: 2017-08-24 expires: never
```

```
ssb> 2048R/21056797 created: 2017-08-24 expires: never
```

```
card-no: 0006 06251544
```

Backup the Primary and Subkeys to USB Storage

```
$ df
$ cd /media/laptop11/1F22-32CC

$ gpg2 --armor --export-secret-keys '$KEYID' > master_with_sub.key

$ gpg2 --armor --export-secret-subkeys '$KEYID' > sub.key

$ gpg2 master_with_sub.key
sec 2048R/E23FAD7B 2017-08-24
uid                               Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
ssb 2048R/3AF0B4AC 2017-08-24
ssb 2048R/28B2789A 2017-08-24
ssb 2048R/21056797 2017-08-24
```

This backs up the contents of the secret keys. Once they are copied to the Yubikey, export only backups the links to the Yubikey. (Links can be recreated by running `gpg --card-status`.)

Remove the Secret Primary Key

```
$ gpg2 --delete-secret-keys "$KEYID"
```

```
sec 2048R/E23FAD7B 2017-08-24 Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

```
Delete this key from the keyring? (y/N) y
```

```
This is a secret key! - really delete? (y/N) y
```

```
$ gpg2 --import sub.key
```

```
$ cd -
```

This is simpler in gpg 2.1+: <https://wiki.debian.org/Subkeys>

Move the Encrypt Secret Subkey to the Card

```
$ . gpg-agentd -r
```

```
$ gpg2 --expert --edit-key "$KEYID"
```

```
Secret key is available.
```

```
pub 2048R/E23FAD7B  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never      usage: SC
                        trust: ultimate  validity: ultimate
sub 2048R/3AF0B4AC  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never      usage: E
sub 2048R/28B2789A  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never      usage: S
sub 2048R/21056797  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never      usage: A
[ultimate] (1). Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

```
gpg> toggle
```

```
sec 2048R/E23FAD7B  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/3AF0B4AC  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/28B2789A  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/21056797  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 06251544
```

```
(1) Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

Move the Encrypt Secret Subkey to the Card

gpg> key 1

```
sec 2048R/E23FAD7B  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb* 2048R/3AF0B4AC  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/28B2789A  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/21056797  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 06251544
(1) Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

gpg> keytocard

```
Signature key .....: [none]
Encryption key.....: [none]
Authentication key: 3D2E 34A5 8444 40E4 AA17 1AC5 8238 E67A 2105 6797
```

Please select where to store the key:

(2) Encryption key

Your selection? 2

Move the Encrypt Secret Subkey to the Card

You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
user: "Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>"
2048-bit RSA key, ID 3AF0B4AC, created 2017-08-24

```
sec 2048R/E23FAD7B  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb* 2048R/3AF0B4AC  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
      card-no: 0006 06251544
ssb 2048R/28B2789A  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/21056797  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
      card-no: 0006 06251544
(1) Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

Move the Sign Secret Subkey to the Card

gpg> key 0

```
sec 2048R/E23FAD7B  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/3AF0B4AC  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 06251544
ssb 2048R/28B2789A  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/21056797  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 06251544
(1) Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

gpg> key 2

```
sec 2048R/E23FAD7B  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/3AF0B4AC  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 06251544
ssb* 2048R/28B2789A  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/21056797  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 06251544
(1) Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

Move the Sign Secret Subkey to the Card

```
gpg> keytocard
```

```
Signature key .....
```

```
Encryption key.....: 8871 80AC F6ED D8BA 4DFA  AB04 A5D2 7B14 3AF0 B4AC
```

```
Authentication key: 3D2E 34A5 8444 40E4 AA17  1AC5 8238 E67A 2105 6797
```

Please select where to store the key:

(1) Signature key

(3) Authentication key

Your selection? 1

Move the Sign Secret Subkey to the Card

You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
user: "Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>"
2048-bit RSA key, ID 28B2789A, created 2017-08-24

```
sec 2048R/E23FAD7B  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
ssb 2048R/3AF0B4AC  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 06251544
ssb* 2048R/28B2789A  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 06251544
ssb 2048R/21056797  created: 2017-08-24  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 06251544
(1) Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

gpg> **save**

Check the Card's Status

```
$ gpg2 --card-status
```

```
Application ID ...: D2760001240102010006062515440000
```

```
Version .....: 2.1
```

```
Manufacturer ..: Yubico
```

```
Serial number ..: 06251544
```

```
Name of cardholder: [not set]
```

```
Language prefs ...: [not set]
```

```
Sex .....: unspecified
```

```
URL of public key : [not set]
```

```
Login data .....: [not set]
```

```
Signature PIN ....: not forced
```

```
Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
```

```
Max. PIN lengths .: 127 127 127
```

```
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
```

```
Signature counter : 0
```

```
Signature key ....: 981D 3CC9 D665 E3DE 468F 29BE 7427 8DEA 28B2 789A
```

```
created .....: 2017-08-24 22:31:32
```

```
Encryption key....: 8871 80AC F6ED D8BA 4DFA AB04 A5D2 7B14 3AF0 B4AC
```

```
created .....: 2017-08-24 22:13:17
```

```
Authentication key: 3D2E 34A5 8444 40E4 AA17 1AC5 8238 E67A 2105 6797
```

```
created .....: 2017-08-24 22:47:12
```

```
General key info..: pub 2048R/28B2789A 2017-08-24 Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
```

Check the Card's Status

```
sec# 2048R/E23FAD7B created: 2017-08-24 expires: never
ssb> 2048R/3AF0B4AC created: 2017-08-24 expires: never
card-no: 0006 06251544
ssb> 2048R/28B2789A created: 2017-08-24 expires: never
card-no: 0006 06251544
ssb> 2048R/21056797 created: 2017-08-24 expires: never
card-no: 0006 06251544
```

indicates the secret key is missing, and > indicates a pointer to the secret key.

3. OpenPGP Usage: Encrypt and Sign

```
$ echo test | gpg2 --encrypt --armor --recipient $KEYID | gpg2 --decrypt --armor
gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID 3AF0B4AC, created 2017-08-24
"Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>"
test
```

```
$ echo test | gpg2 --armor --clearsign --default-key $KEYID | gpg2
test
gpg: Signature made Thu 24 Aug 2017 07:18:14 PM EDT using RSA key ID 28B2789A
gpg: Good signature from "Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>" [ultimate]
```

OpenPGP and *openssh*

```
# host does not allow password authentication
$ ssh postgres@momjian.us
Permission denied (publickey).
```


```
# can also gpgkey2ssh '$KEYID'
# this uses gpg-agentd
$ ssh-add -L > ssh.pub
```

```
$ cat ssh.pub
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQDADEZEXhttp...
```

```
$ sudo sh -c 'cat ssh.pub >> ~postgres/.ssh/authorized_keys'
$ rm ssh.pub
```

```
$ ssh postgres@momjian.us
Last login: Sat Aug 19 12:33:29 2017 from momjian.us
$ id
uid=109(postgres) gid=117(postgres) groups=117(postgres),111(ssl-cert)
```

Applications, Software, and Tools Illustrated




For instructions on using *pcscd* and *scdaemon* tools together, see https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/GnuPG#GnuPG_with_pcscd_.28PCSC_Lite.29.

4. PIV vs OpenPGP


- ▶ Storage differences
 - ▶ PIV stores all per-user information on removable media
 - ▶ OpenPGP
 - ▶ requires storage of per-user OpenPGP public key information in the file system
 - ▶ optionally stores private/secret information on removable media
 - ▶ unsuited for multiple users using the same card reader or USB slot
- ▶ Application support
 - ▶ OpenSSH supports both
 - ▶ OpenSSL supports PIV
 - ▶ *pgp*, *gpg*, *gpg2*, *git commit* support OpenPGP
 - ▶ many email programs support OpenPGP through S/MIME

5. Postgres Usage: Client Side



The signature detects key modifications. The key and data can still be deleted with proper permissions.

Client Uses Decrypted Received Key



The unencrypted symmetric key never appears on the server.

Create Key Table

```
CREATE TABLE user_key (  
    username      NAME PRIMARY KEY,  
    enc_sym_key   BYTEA,  
    signed_hash   BYTEA  
);
```

Compute Key and Signature

```
\set sym_key `openssl rand -hex 32 | tr -d '\n'`
```

```
\echo :sym_key
```

```
e00c82d36d31411987054e8c004c09a0323e4166726de963a35de66394f6edd6
```

```
-- use 1:2 because of signature requirement
```

```
\set enc_sym_key `echo :sym_key | openssl rsautl -engine pkcs11 -keyform
```

```
engine -encrypt -inkey 1:2 -passin file:"$HOME"/.yubikey/piv.pin |
```

```
xxd -p | tr -d '\n'`
```

```
-- create a signed hash of enc_sym_key to detect unauthorized changes
```

```
-- This could be done with openssl using -encrypt then -sign, but openssl
```

```
-- version 1.0.1t doesn't support input data longer than 245 bytes for PIV
```

```
-- rsautl and doesn't support any PIV pkeyutl operations. Therefore, we
```

```
-- manually generate the hash, sign it, and store it in a separate column.
```

```
\set signed_hash `echo :enc_sym_key | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary |
```

```
openssl rsautl -engine pkcs11 -keyform engine -sign -inkey 1:2 -passin
```

```
file:"$HOME"/.yubikey/piv.pin | xxd -p | tr -d '\n'`
```


Populate Key Table

```
INSERT INTO user_key VALUES (CURRENT_USER,  
                             decode(:'enc_sym_key', 'hex'),  
                             decode(:'signed_hash', 'hex'));
```

```
SELECT * FROM user_key WHERE username = CURRENT_USER;
```

username	enc_sym_key	signed_hash
user1	\x994c87a3ca52d8aa43fcf55...	\xc2a52d5465d853cdb76e6b3bd...

Retrieve Encrypted Key and Verify Signature

```
SELECT enc_sym_key, signed_hash FROM user_key WHERE username = CURRENT_USER  
\gset
```

-- check signature, these two hex values should match:

```
\echo `echo :'signed_hash' | cut -c3- | xxd -p -revert | openssl rsautl -engine  
pkcs11 -keyform engine -verify -inkey 1:2 -passin  
file:"$HOME"/.yubikey/piv.pin | xxd -p | tr -d '\n'`  
107dd77e826db987bd1dcb0487de65ba47f1b937fc3355bb84c1e7b24a932481  
\echo `echo :'enc_sym_key' | cut -c3- | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary |  
xxd -p | tr -d '\n'`  
107dd77e826db987bd1dcb0487de65ba47f1b937fc3355bb84c1e7b24a932481
```

Get Symmetric Key

```
\set sym_key `echo :'enc_sym_key' | cut -c3- | xxd -p -revert | openssl rsautl  
-engine pkcs11 -keyform engine -decrypt -inkey 1:2 -passin  
file:"$HOME"/.yubikey/piv.pin`
```

-- symmetric key

```
\echo :sym_key
```

```
e00c82d36d31411987054e8c004c09a0323e4166726de963a35de66394f6edd6
```

With Cryptographic Hardware Removed

```
\set sym_key `echo :'enc_sym_key' | cut -c3- | xxd -p -revert | openssl rsautl  
  -engine pkcs11 -keyform engine -decrypt -inkey 1:2 -passin  
  file:"$HOME"/.yubikey/piv.pin`  
engine "pkcs11" set.  
Invalid slot number: 1  
PKCS11_get_private_key returned NULL  
cannot load Private Key from engine  
140427660957328:error:26096080:engine routines:ENGINE_load_private_key:failed  
loading private key:eng_pkey.c:124:  
unable to load Private Key
```

Create Survey Table and Populate

```
CREATE TABLE survey1 (id SERIAL, username NAME, enc_result BYTEA);
```

```
\set enc `echo 'secret_message' | openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -pass pass::sym_key |  
  xxd -p | tr -d '\n'`
```

```
INSERT INTO survey1 VALUES (DEFAULT, CURRENT_USER, decode(:'enc', 'hex'));
```

```
SELECT * FROM survey1 WHERE username = CURRENT_USER;
```

```
id | username | enc_result  
-----+-----  
1 | user1    | \x53616c7465645f5fa4cbc7d81c989cfa9611e9e4be7bddbf8b4c...
```

Retrieve Data and Decrypt

```
SELECT enc_sym_key, signed_hash FROM user_key WHERE username = CURRENT_USER  
\gset
```

```
-- required signature verification skipped
```


```
\set sym_key `echo :enc_sym_key' | cut -c3- | xxd -p -revert | openssl  
rsautl -engine pkcs11 -keyform engine -decrypt -inkey 1:2 -passin  
file:"$HOME"/.yubikey/piv.pin`
```

```
SELECT * FROM survey1 WHERE username = CURRENT_USER  
\gset
```

```
\set result `echo :enc_result' | cut -c3- | xxd -p -revert |  
openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -pass pass::sym_key`
```


```
\echo :result  
secret_message
```

Client-Side Key and Server-Side Processing




This has the key on the client, the server, the server logs, and over the network.

Server-Side Key: Use *pg_getkey* to Decrypt Stored Key



pg_getkey uses the PKI key to decrypt the on-disk encrypted symmetric key and store it in a server-side variable (GUC).

pgcrypto Uses the Decrypted Key



pgcrypto can use the key stored in the server-side variable. The unencrypted key is never stored unencrypted in the file system.

Install *pg_getkey*

```
$ wget https://momjian.us/download/pg_getkey-1.0.tgz
$ tar xzf pg_getkey-1.0.tgz
$ make top_builddir=/usr/local/src/pgsql clean install
# modify $DESTDIR/bin/pg_getkey_generate
$ pg_getkey_generate
engine "pkcs11" set.
```

Wrote public-key encrypted symmetric key to /u/pgsql/data/pg_getkey.key

Additional steps:

- * Customize the bin/pg_getkey script
 - * Make sure the Postgres binary directory is in server's PATH
 - * Add this to \$PGDATA/postgresql.conf and restart:
 shared_preload_libraries = 'pg_getkey.so'
 - * If the key cannot be loaded, the server will not start and an error message will be written to the Postgres server log
- ```
$ echo 'shared_preload_libraries = 'pg_getkey.so'' >> $PGDATA/postgresql.conf
```

# Check *pg\_getkey*

```
$ pg_ctl restart
```

```
$ psql postgres
```

```
SHOW pg_getkey.key;
```

```
pg_getkey.key
```

```

01c85817bdd7b7de6c5d8047dda80895999da6ac975f04f7596203e399776940
```

```
SELECT setting
```

```
FROM pg_settings
```

```
WHERE name = 'pg_getkey.key';
```

```
setting
```

```

01c85817bdd7b7de6c5d8047dda80895999da6ac975f04f7596203e399776940
```

```
SELECT current_setting('pg_getkey.key');
```

```
current_setting
```

```

01c85817bdd7b7de6c5d8047dda80895999da6ac975f04f7596203e399776940
```

# Use *pg\_getkey*

```
CREATE EXTENSION pgcrypto;
```

```
SELECT pgp_sym_encrypt('secret_message', current_setting('pg_getkey.key'));
 pgp_sym_encrypt
```

```

\x30d04070302436a9eb71085cdad6fd23f01c79...
```


```
SELECT pgp_sym_decrypt(
 pgp_sym_encrypt('secret_message', current_setting('pg_getkey.key'))
 current_setting('pg_getkey.key'));
```

```
pgp_sym_decrypt
```

```

secret_message
```

# Other *pg\_getkey* Key Access Options



# Per-User Keys

Using PL/PERLU, you can:

- ▶ Store per-user keys in the each database, encrypted with cryptographic hardware
  - ▶ PL/PERLU can run operating system commands and store the output
  - ▶ Only the super user can create PL/PERLU functions
- ▶ Have users call a PL/PERLU function to retrieve their symmetric key, like *pg\_getkey*
  - ▶ on first call for each user, add a PKI-encrypted symmetric key row to a database table
  - ▶ on first call per session, decrypt the stored key using cryptographic hardware
  - ▶ cache the result for future calls using a PL/PERLU global variable
- ▶ *shared\_preload\_libraries* speeds up the first use of PL/PERLU in a session
- ▶ This is a combination of the client-side and *pg\_getkey* approaches

# Setup for Per-User Keys

```
CREATE EXTENSION plperl;
```

```
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_key;
```

```
CREATE TABLE user_key (
 username NAME PRIMARY KEY,
 enc_sym_key BYTEA
);
```

```
GRANT SELECT, INSERT ON TABLE user_key TO PUBLIC;
```

# Per-User Keys Function

```
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION pg_get_user_key() RETURNS TEXT AS $$
No precomputed key?
if (!defined($_SHARED{key}))
{
 my $rv = spi_exec_query("
 SELECT encode(enc_sym_key, 'hex')
 FROM user_key
 WHERE username = CURRENT_USER", 1);
 # Add user key row?
 if ($rv->{processed} == 0)
 {
 my $enc_key = `openssl rand -hex 32 | \\\
 openssl rsautl -engine pkcs11 -keyform engine \\\
 -encrypt -inkey 1:3 -passin file:"\\$PIN_FILE" | \\\
 xxd -p`;
 $rv = spi_exec_query("
 INSERT INTO user_key VALUES (
 CURRENT_USER, decode('$enc_key', 'hex'))");
 elog(ERROR, "Could not insert key row")
 if ($rv->{processed} != 1);
 $rv = spi_exec_query("
 SELECT encode(enc_sym_key, 'hex')
 FROM user_key
 WHERE username = CURRENT_USER", 1);
 }
}
```



# Per-User Keys Function

```
eelog(ERROR, "Could not find key row")
 if ($rv->{processed} == 0);
my $enc_sym_key = $rv->{rows}[0]->{encode};
decrypt the key, use 1:3 because only encryption is required
my $key = `echo '$enc_sym_key' | xxd -p -revert | \\
 openssl rsautl -engine pkcs11 -keyform engine -decrypt \\
 -inkey 1:3 -passin file:"\\$PIN_FILE`;
chomp($key);
$_SHARED{key} = $key;
}
return $_SHARED{key};
$$ LANGUAGE plperl;
```

# Per-User Keys Function Usage

```
$ psql -U postgres test
SELECT * FROM user_key;
username | enc_sym_key
-----+-----
```

```
SELECT pg_get_user_key();
 pg_get_user_key
-----+-----
8ae54420dd959ad997580781763732902be5ddef4d587fbd4202d1e258218bcc
```

```
SELECT * FROM user_key;
username | enc_sym_key
-----+-----
postgres | \x0401bb58f0d16daea8b29ca2f5bbfd56bf29336ab01d6b3b8388...
```

```
SELECT pgp_sym_decrypt(
 pgp_sym_encrypt('secret_message', pg_get_user_key()),
 pg_get_user_key());
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----+-----
secret_message
```

# Add a Second User

```
$ psql -U bob test
SELECT * FROM user_key;
username | enc_sym_key
-----+-----
postgres | \x0401bb58f0d16daea8b29ca2f5bbfd56bf29336ab01d6b3b8388...

SELECT pg_get_user_key();
pg_get_user_key

d43e5f52b0776ac34caf2f6b17a4884eab6cf683954ba2d8208e2ef8f348a0da

SELECT * FROM user_key;
username | enc_sym_key
-----+-----
postgres | \x0401bb58f0d16daea8b29ca2f5bbfd56bf29336ab01d6b3b8388...
bob | \x5764364dcc8d3e914682b8642646adc9a559f7e156d636c83616...
```

# Show the First User Is Unchanged

```
$ psql -U postgres test
SELECT pg_get_user_key();
 pg_get_user_key
```

```

8ae54420dd959ad997580781763732902be5ddef4d587fbd4202d1e258218bcc
```

A restricted administrative function could be written that decrypts multiple user keys in the same session.

# Transparent Encryption

- ▶ Allow encryption to be transparent to application developers, though not to administrators
- ▶ The unencrypted key is never stored on disk or on backup media, or sent over the network
- ▶ Standby servers would need identically-configured cryptographic hardware
- ▶ Key backups should be stored securely in a way that standard software can use, e.g., *openssl*
- ▶ The examples use *pg\_getkey*, but per-user keys could also be used with a more complex permission setup

# Create Table and View

```
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgcrypto;
```

```
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS survey1 CASCADE;
```

```
CREATE TABLE survey1 (id SERIAL, username NAME, enc_result BYTEA);
```

```
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW survey1_view AS
SELECT id, username, pgp_sym_decrypt(enc_result,
 current_setting('pg_getkey.key')) AS enc_result
FROM survey1;
```

# Create Trigger

```
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION survey1_view_ins_upd() RETURNS trigger AS $$
BEGIN
 IF (TG_OP = 'INSERT')
 THEN INSERT INTO survey1 VALUES (DEFAULT, NEW.username,
 pgp_sym_encrypt(NEW.enc_result,
 current_setting('pg_getkey.key')));
 ELSIF (TG_OP = 'UPDATE')
 THEN UPDATE survey1 SET id = NEW.id, username = NEW.username,
 enc_result = pgp_sym_encrypt(NEW.enc_result,
 current_setting('pg_getkey.key'))
 WHERE id = OLD.id;
 IF NOT FOUND
 THEN RETURN NULL;
 END IF;
 END IF;
 RETURN NEW;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;

CREATE TRIGGER survey1_view_trigger
INSTEAD OF INSERT OR UPDATE ON survey1_view
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE PROCEDURE survey1_view_ins_upd();
```

# Transparent INSERT

```
INSERT INTO survey1_view VALUES (DEFAULT, CURRENT_USER, 'test');
```

```
SELECT * FROM survey1_view;
```

| id | username | enc_result |
|----|----------|------------|
| 1  | postgres | test       |

```
SELECT * FROM survey1;
```

| id | username | enc_result                                               |
|----|----------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| 1  | postgres | \xc30d040703028c885c43606e062b7bd235011482f275a8d3de4... |



# Transparent UPDATE

```
UPDATE survey1_view SET username = 'user1', enc_result = 'test2'
WHERE enc_result = 'test';
```

```
SELECT * FROM survey1_view;
```

| id | username | enc_result |
|----|----------|------------|
| 1  | user1    | test2      |

```
SELECT * FROM survey1;
```

| id | username | enc_result                                            |
|----|----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| 1  | user1    | \xc30d0407030242f7c649c9eb708363d2360112277444c6b650d |

# Transparent DELETE

```
DELETE FROM survey1_view
WHERE enc_result = 'test2';
```

```
SELECT * FROM survey1_view;
id | username | enc_result
---+-----+-----
```

```
SELECT * FROM survey1;
id | username | enc_result
---+-----+-----
```

# SELECT Translation

Notice the WHERE clause references the unencrypted value.  
Internally the SELECT is processed as:

```
EXPLAIN VERBOSE SELECT *
FROM survey1_view
WHERE enc_result = 'test2';
```

QUERY PLAN

```

Seq Scan on public.survey1 (cost=0.00..21.04 rows=3 width=100)
 Output: survey1.id, survey1.username,
 pgp_sym_decrypt(survey1.enc_result,
 current_setting('pg_getkey.key'::text))
 Filter: (pgp_sym_decrypt(survey1.enc_result,
 current_setting('pg_getkey.key'::text)) =
 'test2'::text)
```

# UPDATE Translation

```
EXPLAIN VERBOSE UPDATE survey1_view
SET username = 'user1', enc_result = 'test3'
WHERE enc_result = 'test2';
```

## QUERY PLAN

---

```
Update on public.survey1_view (cost=0.00..21.04 rows=3 width=138)
-> Seq Scan on public.survey1 (cost=0.00..21.04 rows=3 width=138)
 Output: survey1.id, 'user1'::name, 'test3'::text,
 ROW(survey1.id, survey1.username,
 pgp_sym_decrypt(survey1.enc_result,
 current_setting('pg_getkey.key'::text))),
 survey1.ctid
 Filter: (pgp_sym_decrypt(survey1.enc_result,
 current_setting('pg_getkey.key'::text)) =
 'test2'::text)
```

# Performance Considerations

- ▶ Accessing cryptographic hardware only at server start has minimal performance impact
  - ▶ accessing it once per session and caching the key can have a performance impact
  - ▶ accessing it for every key access might have an unacceptable performance impact
- ▶ Concurrent cryptographic hardware access is controlled by operating system tools
- ▶ Yubikey RSA 2048-bit decryption is 40x slower than pure *openssl* software-based decryption
- ▶ *openssl* RSA 2048-bit software-based decryption is 2x slower than AES256 decryption (with CPU acceleration)

# Indexing Encrypted Data

- ▶ Indexing decrypted values cannot be done safely since it would cause unencrypted data to be written to disk.
- ▶ Indexing encrypted data requires that all index entries and lookups use the same initialization vector.
- ▶ Unfortunately, this causes duplicate values to have identical index entries, causing **possible information leakage**.
- ▶ `pgp_sym_encrypt()` uses a different random salt and initialization vector for each encryption.
- ▶ Therefore, indexed data must use `encrypt()`, which uses a fixed initialization vector and no salt.
- ▶ Encrypted data length can also leak information, though this is not specific to indexes.

# Example of Indexing Encrypted Data

```
CREATE TABLE emp (emp_id SERIAL, name TEXT, country BYTEA);
```

```
-- bytea fields can be long, so use a hash index
```

```
CREATE INDEX i_emp ON emp USING hash (country);
```

```
-- i.e., echo -n 'Pakistan' | openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -K pg_getkey.key -iv ''
```

```
INSERT INTO emp
```

```
VALUES (DEFAULT, 'Andy', encrypt('Pakistan',
 current_setting('pg_getkey.key')::bytea, 'aes'));
```

```
SET enable_seqscan = false;
```

```
ANALYZE emp;
```

```
EXPLAIN SELECT emp_id, name
```

```
FROM emp
```

```
WHERE country = encrypt('Pakistan',
 current_setting('pg_getkey.key')::bytea, 'aes');
```

```
QUERY PLAN
```

```

Index Scan using i_emp on emp (cost=0.00..8.02 rows=1 width=9)
```

```
Index Cond: (country = '\xa92e404e54bfc5900c785d4e484bfdd8'::bytea)
```

# Data Key Expiration

- ▶ Configure the system to store the current and previous data encryption keys
- ▶ Store the key version number with the data
- ▶ On INSERT, use the current key and store the key version number
- ▶ For other operations, try the current and previous keys
- ▶ Run a background process to update all the rows that used the previous key to use the current key
  - ▶ once complete, remove the previous key



## 6. Database Encryption Scope

There are two popular uses of encryption in databases:

1. Encryption of data
2. Encryption of keys

Typically, data is encrypted with a symmetric key (1), and the symmetric key is encrypted with a public key and stored (2). The private/decryption/master key can be stored server-side, client-side, or on a network-attached device (e.g., HSM), and can be stored in cryptographic hardware. Data signing is also possible.

# Data Encryption Key Storage Options

| Data Encryption Key Scope | Data Encryption Key Storage |             |                |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|----------------|
|                           | Server File System          | Client-Side | Database       |
| Cluster-wide <sup>1</sup> | ✓                           |             |                |
| User <sup>2</sup>         |                             | ✓           | ✓ <sup>3</sup> |
| Database                  |                             |             | ✓              |
| User/database             |                             |             | ✓ <sup>3</sup> |
| Table                     |                             |             | ✓              |
| Row                       |                             |             | ✓              |
| Column <sup>4</sup>       |                             |             | ✓              |
| Field                     |                             |             | ✓              |

1 All database users have the same security access. It blocks access to users with read-only access to the file system and replication. Storage theft is also protected.

2 Data encrypted with per-user keys must be easily identifiable as belonging to that user, e.g., user name column.

3 Stores the encryption is in the the database, but ideally the master key is client-side.

4 It is unclear where to store the encryption key.

# Number of Data Encryption Keys

Theoretically you can use a different encryption key for every field. However, practically, anyone with the master key can decrypt the encryption key, so it is really the master key that controls access.

The optimal number of encryption keys is the number of users plus the number of user groups needed to control access. The groups can be:

- ▶ predefined, e.g., confidential, top secret
- ▶ user-defined, e.g., staff, development
- ▶ ad hoc, e.g., allow access to user1, user5, and user12

# Predefined Encryption Categories

```
CREATE TABLE user_key (
 username NAME PRIMARY KEY,
 enc_sym_key BYTEA,
 confidential BYTEA,
 secret BYTEA,
 top_secret BYTEA
);
```

The same predefined category key, e.g., confidential, is encrypted with each user's public key. A NULL value indicates the user does not have access to that security level. Signing of the encrypted keys would prevent malicious tampering, e.g., changing the key to a known value. Of course, data must be labeled with its security level.

# User-Defined Encryption Categories

```
CREATE TABLE group_key (
 groupname NAME PRIMARY KEY,
 username NAME[],
 enc_sym_key BYTEA[]
);
```

The same encryption key is public-key encrypted by each user's public key that is in the group. Applications must identify the group name that encrypted the data and look up their matching username in this table. Data must be labeled with its encryption category.

# Ad Hoc Encryption Options

```
CREATE TABLE user_data (
 id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
 enc_sym_data BYTEA,
 rolename NAME[],
 enc_sym_key BYTEA[]
);
```

*rolename* is a list of user and group names. *enc\_sym\_key* is the symmetric encryption key encrypted with every role's public key. This does not require data labeling since role names are stored with the data.

## 7. Private Key Storage Options

While encryption using the public key requires no privileged access, there are several options to store the private key:

- ▶ Store in the file system
  - ▶ unencrypted
  - ▶ encrypted, and require a password to decrypt it
  - ▶ encrypted, and require a PIV device and a PIN (and optional touch) to decrypt it

# Private Key Storage Options

- ▶ Store in dedicated cryptographic hardware:
  - ▶ removable PIV card (e.g., CAC) and require a PIN and card reader
  - ▶ PIV/USB combined device (e.g., Yubikey 4) and require a PIN and optional touch
  - ▶ USB-connected hardware security module (HSM) that can do auditing, complex access control, and store many more keys
  - ▶ network-connected HSM, e.g., KMIP
  - ▶ external keys allow external (and more secure) logging of key access

HSM: <https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/36664/criteria-for-selecting-an-hsm><https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/vpns/overview-hardware-security-modules-757>



# Encryption Locations

| Encryption Location <sup>1</sup> | Encryption Provided          |                                     |                             |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                                  | Offline Storage <sup>2</sup> | Online Storage/WAL/Replicas/Backups | Data in Queries/Logs/Memory |
| Client-side column encryption    | ✓                            | ✓                                   | ✓                           |
| Server-side column encryption    | ✓                            | ✓                                   |                             |
| File system encryption           | ✓                            |                                     |                             |

1 Assumes secure key storage

2 If the storage is remote and online, it is also effectively encrypted to anyone without access to the server containing the decryption key.

## 8. Conclusion



<http://momjian.us/presentations>

<https://www.flickr.com/photos/socsci/>